Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of Evidence by Tillers, Peter
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 6 
1993 
Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of Evidence 
Peter Tillers 
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter Tillers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of Evidence, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1465 (1993). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss6/25 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, PROBABILITY, 
AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
Peter Tillers* 
"BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVI-
DENCE. By Barbara J. Shapiro. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1991. Pp. xv, 365. $42.50. 
INTRODUCTION 
Revolutions are proclaimed more often than they occur. Nonethe-
less, we seem to be in the midst of a "probabilistic revolution." 1 This 
revolution goes beyond physics and Heisenberg's well-known Uncer-
tainty Principle,2 and it goes far beyond the relativistic nihilism of 
Critical Legal Studies. The probabilistic revolution extends to a wide 
variety of academic fields, including the social sciences, 3 decision the-
ory, 4 biology,5 economics,6 logic,7 and philosophy of science.8 This 
* Professor of Law, Director, International Seminar on Evidence in Litigation, Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 1966, Yale; J.D. 1969, LL.M. 1972, Harvard. 
- Ed. I thank John Langbein, Richard Lempert, and David Schum for their comments. Errors 
and omissions are my own. 
I. See generally THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION (Lorenz Kriiger et al. eds., 1987); STE-
PHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS: THE MEASUREMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 
BEFORE 1900 (1986). 
2. See, e.g .• MICHAEL AUDI, THE INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 1-17 (1973); 
JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRODINGER'S CAT: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND REALITY 119-
20, 155-57 (1984); David C. Cassidy, Heisenberg, Uncertainty and the Quantum Revolution, Sci. 
AM., May 1992, at 106. 
3. See generally 2 THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 7-131 (discussing 
probability and statistics in psychology and sociology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
4. See, e.g .• RICHARD JEFFREY, THE Lome OF DECISION (2d ed. 1983); DETLOF VON 
WINTERFELDT & WARD EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 
(1986); Ward Edwards, Dynamic Decision Theory and Probabilistic Information Processing, 4 
HUM. FACTORS 59 (1962). 
5. See generally 2 THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 227-369 (concerning 
evolutionary biology). The probabilistic and statistical character of genetics was recognized long 
ago. See STIGLER, supra note 1, at 263-361. The random character of genetic processes plays a 
central role in debates about the forensic use of DNA evidence. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, 
Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Rever-
end Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 303 (1991). 
6. See generally 2 THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 133-97. 
7. See, e.g., Ronald R. Yager, New Paradigms for Reasoning with Uncertain Information, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1005 (1991); L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8 INFO. & CONTROL 338 (1965). 
8. See, e.g., Richard C. Jeffrey, Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses, 23 PHIL. 
OF SCI. 237 (1956), reprinted in RICHARD c. JEFFREY, PROBABILITY AND THE ART OF JUDG-
MENT 14 (1992). 
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revolution is not confined to the academy. For example, it has influ-
enced the art of statecraft,9 the conduct of war and business, the tac-
tics of election campaigning, Io and the practice of medicine. I I 
The Anglo-American law of evidence may have anticipated the 
probabilistic transformation of contemporary social and political life. 12 
For quite some time - at least for 100 years and, if Professor Barbara 
Shapiro13 is right, for at least 200 years - the governing assumption 
of this body of law has been that all or practically all facts are uncer-
tain and that proof of facts is always or almost always a matter of 
probabilities. 14 Legal scholarship has also long emphasized the proba-
bilistic nature of judicial proof. 15 In recent years scholarly interest in 
the topic of uncertain forensic proof has intensified. As the use of 
statistical evidence in courtrooms has increased, legal scholars have 
devoted more and more attention to formal theories of uncertainty. 
This "new evidence scholarship"I6 has generated a large body of liter-
ature on "trial by mathematics" and statistical evidence.17 
9. The use of statistics by governments and bureaucrats was an early development. See, e.g., 
IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 16-54, 189-199 (1990). Problems of "social engineer-
ing" spurred the development of both probability theory and statistical theory. For example, the 
"law of large numbers" was in part the result of ruminations about the optimal number of judges 
or jurors. See id. at 81-104; LoRRAINE DASTON, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE ENLIGHTEN-
MENT 342-68 (1988). There has been an effort to persuade intelligence analysts to think in 
overtly probabilistic terms. See DAVID A. SCHUM, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTEL-
LIGENCE ANALYST (1987). How successful this effort has been I cannot say. 
10. The influence of polling on election campaigns requires no documentation. 
11. Ward Edwards, Summing Up: The Society of Bayesian Trial Lawyers, 66 B.U. L. REV. 
937, 937 (1986) (describing a doctor who uses a computer when making diagnoses). 
12. Some students of the history of probability and statistics suggest that problems of foren· 
sic proof helped to inspire the development of formal probability theory by Enlightenment theo-
rists. See DASTON, supra note 9, at xiv-xv ("Enlightenment jurisprudence ... contributed to the 
notion of rationality that the probabilists hoped to mathematize ... . ");id. at xvi (legal influences 
were particularly influential during the "prehistory" of mathematical probability); id. at 14-15; 
see also supra note 9. However, the imagination of these Enlightenment theorists was generally 
stirred by Continental rather than Anglo-American problems of forensic proof. 
13. Barbara J. Shapiro is Professor of Rhetoric at the University of California at Berkeley. 
14. See, e.g., Brown v. Schock, 77 Pa. 471, 479 (1875); Stevenson v. Stewart, 11 Pa. 307, 
308-09 (1849) ("[T]he competency of a collateral fact to be used as the basis of legitimate argu-
ment, is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it may afford in reference to 
the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry, 
or to assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded in truth."). 
15. The idea that proof is a matter of probabilities is implicit in the version of the relevance 
rule espoused by James Bradley Thayer in the nineteenth century. See James B. Thayer, Pre-
sumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REv. 141, 144-45 (1889); see also 1 JOHN H. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW§ 10 (Tillers rev., 1983); IA JOHN H. WIG· 
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§§ 38-41 (Tillers rev., 1983) (citing numerous 
cases and much secondary literature endorsing the relevance rule and the principle that proof of 
facts is frequently or always inconclusive). 
16. Richard Lempert invented the label "new evidence scholarship." See Richard Lempert, 
The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof. 66 B.U. L. REV. 439 (1986). 
17. See, e.g., Conference, Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 
(1991); Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377 
(1986). See the survey of similar literature before 1983 in IA \VIGMORE, supra note 15, § 37.1, at 
1011-13; id. § 37.6. 
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Despite the long pedigree of probability in the law of evidence and 
in evidence scholarship, there are sharp disagreements today about the 
basic nature of forensic proof. Some legal scholars are deeply skeptical 
about, if not necessarily opposed to, the new evidence scholarship. 18 
New evidence scholars themselves disagree about the nature of foren-
sic evidence, inference, and proof. 19 Although the result has been a 
lively and interesting debate, some of the participants in this debate 
have staked out positions that appear to be irreconcilable. Sometimes 
the protagonists seem not even to understand each other. In situations 
such as this, it is often useful to consider how scholarly debates and 
discussions came to have the character that they do; a look into the 
past can put problems in a new light. Fortunately, in recent years 
scholars have produced several enlightening studies of the historical 
ongms of our present-day conceptions of uncertainty and 
probability.20 I had hoped that Shapiro's study of the origins of the 
law of evidence would shed still more light on the phenomenon of 
uncertainty. I regret to say that Beyond Reasonable Doubt did not live 
up to my expectations. 
I. HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP 
Shapiro devotes a large part of her new book to the history of the 
reasonable doubt and probable cause standards in the "Anglo-Ameri-
can"21 criminal process. Shapiro calls her investigation "a member of 
the species intellectual history of which the history of legal doctrine is 
a subspecies" (p. 249). Thus, Shapiro examines the "intellectual bag-
gage" that underlies the "talismans" of reasonable doubt and probable 
18. See, e.g., Paul Bergman & Al Moore, Mistrial by Likelihood Ratio: Bayesian Analysis 
Meets the F-Word, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 589 (1991); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., "There'll Always 
Be an England": The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204 (1987) (review-
ing WILLIAM TwINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985)); Leonard 
R. Jaffee, Prior Probability-A Black Hole in the Mathematician's View of the Sufficiency and 
Weight of Evidence, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 967 (1988); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? 
On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 
(1971). 
19. The new evidence scholarship is not a monolithic intellectual movement. Peter Tillers, 
Introduction to Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 
381, 382-83, 389-90 (1986); Peter Tillers, Prejudice, Politics, and Proof, 86 MICH. L. REv. 768, 
771 (1988). 
20. See, e.g., DASrON, supra note 9; IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THE EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND STATIS-
TICAL INFERENCE (1975); HACKING, supra note 9; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE 
LAW OF PROOF (1977); STIGLER, supra note 1; WILLIAM TwINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: 
BENTHAM & WIGMORE (1985); John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1978); see also DAVID SCHUM, EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPLEX 
INFERENCE ch. 2 (forthcoming 1994). 
21. Shapiro's focus is generally on the criminal process before 1800. Shapiro correctly ob-
serves that the differences between English and American criminal practice were not as great 
before 1800 as they are now. Seep. 251. 
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cause. 22 Shapiro's discussion of the origins and evolution of reason-
able doubt and probable cause, however, is part of a more general his-
torical argument. Shapiro maintains that a new empiricist philosophy 
crystallized in Britain late in the seventeenth century and made its 
presence felt in fields such as theology, natural science, history, and 
philosophy. She argues that this new empiricism (as well as other in-
tellectual traditions) influenced the development of the Anglo-Ameri-
can law of evidence and that by the nineteenth century empiricist 
terminology and ideas dominated legal discourse about evidence. Be-
yond Reasonable Doubt describes how empiricist language and notions 
crept into legal literature. To show how empiricist language and prin-
ciples gradually infiltrated and took over the law of evidence itself, 
Shapiro traces changes both in the criminal process and in a variety of 
legal doctrines. 
The subject matter of Beyond Reasonable Doubt is vast. Building 
on her earlier work, 23 Shapiro surveys intellectual currents not only in 
the law, but also in fields such as science, religion, rhetoric, and philos-
ophy. The geographical range of Shapiro's book is also wide. She dis-
cusses developments in Scotland, America, and Continental Europe as 
well as England. Furthermore, Beyond Reasonable Doubt covers a 
great deal of time. Shapiro's book emphasizes developments from 
1500 to 1800, a period of three centuries. Shapiro also discusses mat-
ters such as trial by jury in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries24 
and the Romano-canon legal tradition in the Middle Ages.25 Alto-
gether, Beyond Reasonable Doubt discusses developments over the 
course of more than half a millennium of Western history.26 
The sweeping proportions of Beyond Reasonable Doubt may be jus-
22. P. xii. Shapiro gives at least two different explanations for the significance of the reason-
able doubt and probable cause standards. First, Shapiro sometimes emphasizes the idea that 
legal formulations of these standards affected actual legal practice. See, e.g., p. xii ("[T]here is 
some reason to believe that the saying did have some impact on the doing."). Second, Shapiro 
notes the ideological or "legitimating" function of formulations of rules of evidence. See p. 252 
("[This book] is about the construction of doctrines that would legitimate a fact-finding regime 
that was obviously full of human error and on which the lives and liberties of many citizens 
depended."); see also p. 249 ("The development oflegal ideas ... has played an important role in 
shaping the ways in which legal systems work. or at least in shaping contemporary and subsequent 
perceptions of how they work." (emphasis added)). 
23. BARBARA J, SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION, HIS-
TORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE (1983); Barbara J. Shapiro, Law and Science in Seventeenth-
Century England, 21 STAN. L. REv. 727 (1969); Barbara J. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty'~· 
Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850. 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (1986). 
24. See, e.g., pp. 3-4. 
25. See, e.g., pp. 115-20. 
26. Shapiro acknowledges that she takes a "long view." P. 250. Although she admits that 
"long-term approaches cannot provide the same detailed attention to context" that short-term 
approaches can, she argues that a long view is "essential for tracing the central intellectual dy-
namic of the history of the law of evidence" because "that dynamic is one in which ideas or 
doctrines created in one era and context are adapted and recycled in another." P. 250. 
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tified. Shapiro's historiographical tastes run toward intellectual his-
tory. It is notoriously difficult to pinpoint the exact place or time of 
important changes in the "thinking" of a society27 or culture; intellec-
tual traditions often originate in distant times and places and broad 
intellectual currents ordinarily change slowly.. Shapiro's preference 
for intellectual history, however, does not fully explain the scope of 
her investigation. Shapiro examines developments after 1800 as well 
as developments before 1500. Of course, no particular year can serve 
as a definitive marker of the end of an intellectual tradition; like old 
soldiers, intellectual currents fade away slowly. However, Shapiro dis-
cusses developments that occurred long after 1800. For example, she 
considers the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of probable cause in the 
1980s (p. 147). Because Shapiro peers into the present as well as into 
the past, it is fair to infer that Shapiro wants to throw light on contem-
porary problems in the law of evidence as well as on the historical 
origins of the law of evidence. 
The history of the law of evidence is an unjustly neglected field of 
scholarship. Shapiro's earlier work has already done much to fill this 
void.28 Beyond Reasonable Doubt appears to be another important ad-
dition to scholarship in the history of the law of evidence. Shapiro's 
discussion of the intellectual background of the modern law of evi-
dence contains a wealth of interesting detail, much of which is new to 
me. For example, I first learned from Shapiro about the possible influ-
ence of both the rhetorical tradition and English religious casuistry on 
the early English law of evidence. 29 Moreover, Shapiro's explanation 
of the medieval view of presumptions (pp. 213-41) is useful for ama-
teur legal historians like myself who occasionally forage in older Eng-
lish reports for interesting discussions of evidence. However, since I 
am only an amateur in matters historical, I am not in a position to 
make a definitive judgment about Beyond Reasonable Doubt as a work 
of historical scholarship. Hence, in this essay I focus on the signifi-
cance of Beyond Reasonable Doubt for contemporary evidence schol-
arship; I say little about its significance for historical scholarship. 
My attitude of agnosticism about the extent of Shapiro's contribu-
tion to historical scholarship is not disingenuous; although I believe 
that Beyond Reasonable Doubt adds little to our understanding of con-
temporary problems of evidence and proof in the law or to our under-
standing of the nature of evidence and proof in general, I believe that 
my critique of the theoretical dimensions of Shapiro's book does not 
necessarily call into question Shapiro's contributions to legal and intel-
lectual history. Nonetheless, my critique of Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
27. Shapiro's concern is not so much with ideas in society at large, but with the opinions and 
ideas of "legal professionals and relatively educated persons." P. 252. 
28. See supra note 23. 
29. Pp. 13-18; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 78-86. 
1470 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1465 
may speak to the nature of Shapiro's contributions to historical 
scholarship. 
Although Shapiro's main interest is intellectual history and Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt is generally "short ... on institutions" (p. 251), 
Shapiro does dabble in the history of legal institutions; she asserts that 
her general findings lie "at the boundary between intellectual and in-
stitutional history" (p. xv). As I explain in the remaining parts of this 
essay, Shapiro's theoretical arguments in Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
are unsatisfactory because they rest on theoretically unsophisticated 
notions about the nature of evidence, inference, probability, and proof. 
In one respect, the thepretical shortcomings of Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt affect Shapiro's historical arguments as well as her theoretical 
claims; they throw into question Shapiro's analysis of the causal rela-
tionship between institutional change and changes in the law of proof. 
Shapiro's discussion of the historical connection between the Anglo-
American law of evidence and the institution of the trial jury is a case 
in point. 
Shapiro explains the emergence of rules of evidence in criminal tri-
als in England not by reference to intellectual currents and traditions, 
but by reference to changes in the way that the jury was expected to 
work. The modern trial jury is a passive body. It is not permitted to 
conduct its own investigation. It is not even permitted to make use of 
evidence that individual jurors chanced to acquire before they became 
jurors; generally speaking, the jury is permitted to consider only the 
evidence submitted by the parties at the trial. According to Shapiro 
and other historians, the medieval English trial jury was a "self-in-
forming" body (p. 4). It was permitted and expected to conduct its 
own investigation, and it was permitted and expected to consider evi-
dence and information within the personal knowledge of members of 
the jury. The idea that jurors may consider only the evidence that the 
parties present at trial was a later development, one that is completely 
antithetical to the medieval conception of the role of the jury. The 
medieval jury was expected to be the repository of the evidence and 
the facts; if the standard historical account holds water, no one would 
have imagined that the parties would have to inform the jury of the 
evidence and the facts. 
Shapiro explains the emergence of rules of evidence in the English 
criminal process by reference to this transformation of the trial jury 
from a self-informing body to a passive receptacle for evidence submit-
ted by others. Shapiro claims that rules of evidence became necessary 
when the jury ceased to be a self-informing body because at that point 
it became necessary for the jury to rely primarily on the testimony of 
witnesses rather than on the jury's own observations and investigation. 
She asserts that when the jury was a self-informing body "there had 
been no need to construct a rationale for the truth-finding capacities of 
May 1993) History: Probability and Evidence 1471 
juries" (p. 11). Elsewhere she states: "A turning point occurred in 
1563, when legislation compelled the attendance of witnesses and 
made perjury a crime. As witnesses became more important, juries 
increasingly required standards for the evaluation of testimony" (p. 6). 
Shapiro's reasoning implies that truth-seeking considerations explain 
the historical connection between the emergence of rules of evidence 
and the change in the role of the jury in the criminal process; she 
implies that the need for reliable assessment of testimonial evidence 
made rules of evidence necessary. 
Shapiro's explanation of the birth of rules of evidence in medieval 
England is suspect. Shapiro acknowledges that even when the jury 
was a "self-informing" body it had to rely on sources of information 
other than the direct personal knowledge of its members. 30 If un-
sworn or informal witnesses as well as sworn or official witnesses can 
make mistakes and lie, the epistemic need for rules of evidence may be 
as great (or as little) when the jury is a self-informing body as when it 
is not. Moreover, even if one makes the unrealistic assumption that 
medieval juries acquired evidence solely by direct observation of non-
testimonial evidence, jurors themselves are subject to "testimonial" in-
firmities such as weak eyesight and weak memory. Hence, if the 
weakness of testimonial evidence alone creates a need for rules of evi-
dence, this need exists even if the jury obtains all of its information 
from nontestimonial sources. 
Although it is possible that truth-seeking considerations explain 
why rules of evidence are more important when the jury is a relatively 
passive receptor of evidence than when it is an active, self-informing, 
and investigative body, Shapiro had to say more than she did to ex-
plain why that is so.31 A more satisfactory account of the origins and 
persistence of rules of evidence would consider not just the role of the 
trial jury, but also matters such as the procedural rules governing the 
trial and pretrial process, the role of actors such as the trial judge, the 
interests of participants in litigation, the importance attached to the 
accuracy of the proof process, and the ordinary, or natural, inferential 
methods of fact finders. 
Professor John Langbein's work illustrates the kind of research 
and analysis that is required to explain the origins of the rules of evi-
30. P. 4. Shapiro observes that recent studies have challenged the assumption that the jury 
was a fully "self-informing" body. P. 4. Even if such studies did not exist, one could safely 
assume that the self-informing jury did not get all of its information from its own first-hand 
observations; even if self-informing juries conducted their own factual investigation, they must 
have gotten some of their information from nonjurors. 
31. Although it may be unwise to require investigative bodies to adhere to formal rules of 
evidence, see 1 WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 4, at 53-54, the folly of such a requirement is not self-
evident. For example, the probable cause standard applies to grand juries. Moreover, some 
states today ostensibly require that grand juries rely only on "legal evidence" when making a 
probable cause determination. Id. at 56 n.34. But cf id. at 59 n.35 (The Supreme Court recog-
nized that federal grand juries are not bound to follow ordinary rules of evidence.). 
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dence. For example, Langbein's work speaks to the influence of the 
interests of participants in litigation on the law of proof; in one paper 
he takes the position that the existence of rules of evidence has more to 
do with the participation of lawyers in the adjudicative process than 
with the institution of trial by jury.32 Langbein's work also illustrates 
why it matters how much importance a society or a legal system at-
taches to the accurate determination of facts in adjudication. 
Although Langbein emphasizes the corrupting influence of the inter-
ests and ideologies of groups such as lawyers, he also assumes that 
bankrupt proof schemes tend to break down precisely because they are 
bankrupt: an epistemologically impoverished proof regimen begins to 
collapse when its poverty becomes apparent.33 This thesis presupposes 
that society, or a relevant segment of it, sees accurate fact finding as a 
central function of its system of adjudication. Finally, although 
Langbein does not directly address the question of how ordinary infer-
ential processes work, his arguments suggest that this question is also 
important. Langbein's belief that corrupt proof systems tend to break 
down when their corruption becomes apparent assumes that there is a 
tension between inadequate, legally prescribed methods of fact finding 
and sensible, natural methods of finding facts, a tension that eventu-
ally becomes too great for a society to bear. Whether or not Langbein 
is right to assume that ordinary, or natural, inference works well, this 
question is relevant to hypotheses about the historical origins of the 
rules of evidence. 34 
II. PROBABILITY AND PROBABILITY THEORY 
Shapiro's book ends with a short appendix on mathematical theo-
ries of probability. In this appendix she observes: "The frequent ref-
erence to the concept of probability [in this book] no doubt reminds 
the reader of mathematical notions of probability and of contemporary 
discussion of the role of mathematical probability and the law" (p. 
253). Shapiro is correct. Many of the arguments and theories that she 
surveys and many of Shapiro's own discussions are reminiscent of 
mathematical theories of probability. This is not surprising. The 
emergence of a new concept of probability is one of the central themes 
of Shapiro's work.35 Nevertheless, Shapiro's short appendix is her 
32. Langbein, supra note 20, at 306. 
33. Id. at 300-16; John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12-
22 (1978). 
34. In recent years there have been important empirical studies of how natural, or ordinary, 
factual inference works. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 151-58 (1983); Mar-
garet Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perception of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. 
REV. 703 (1992); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Mak· 
ing: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991) (summarizing results of prior research). 
Perhaps historians of the law of evidence should examine some of this literature. 
35. See, e.g., p. xiii (Beyond Reasonable Doubt is about "how changing conceptions of 
probability and certainty helped to shape legal formulations."). 
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only significant discussion of formal probability theory. 
Shapiro's decision to give short shrift to formal probability theory 
may have been unwise. Modem theories of evidence, inference, and 
proof - including mathematical theories - may be relevant to the 
historical study of conceptions of evidence and proof. Moreover, in-
terest in mathematical approaches to problems of forensic proof is not 
new. Shapiro herself mentions various English and American legal 
scholars and intellectuals who discussed the use of numbers and math-
ematics in argument about evidence (pp. 253-55). Although Shapiro 
does not explain why she ignores mathematical theories even when she 
examines the work of these theorists, 36 her brief comments in the ap-
pendix suggest that she felt free to do so because British and American 
legal scholars generally rejected mathematical and numerical meth-
ods. 37 This, however, is not a sufficient reason for ignoring mathemat-
ical theories of probability. If the people whose thinking we wish to 
decipher believed that mathematical methods merit attention, the 
methods they considered (and rejected) should also interest us. The 
precise grounds for their rejection of mathematical analysis can tell us 
much about their views about evidence and proof in adjudication. For 
example, it would be useful to know whether they objected to the use 
of numbers because they believed that (a) mathematical theories of 
probability are "wrong," (b) decision makers such as jurors do not 
know how to compute probabilities by using numbers, (c) the use of 
numbers requires excessively precise probability estimates, or ( d) 
moral, social, or institutional considerations make it important to al-
low decision makers such as jurors to make judgments about facts in 
an ordinary way. Or did they reject mathematical analysis simply be-
cause (e) they did not understand mathematical probability or because 
(f) they sensed that the mathematical theories of probability of their 
day were not rich enough to capture the true complexity of problems 
of evidence in the law? 
To determine why British and American intellectual figures in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries rejected mathemati-
cal analysis of evidence, it may be necessary to study the mathematical 
36. Shapiro acknowledges the work of historians of probability such as Lorraine Daston and 
Ian Hacking. See p. 329 n.1. Daston has much to say about the historical relationship between 
legal conceptions of proof and mathematical theories of probability. See DASTON, supra note 9, 
at xiv-xvi, 14-15, 342-68; see also HACKING, supra note 9. 
37. Shapiro's appendix on probability theory apparently does not exaggerate the general 
aversion of American and English historical scholars to mathematical and numerical analysis of 
evidence. However, William Best was a notable exception. See 1 WILLIAM BEST, THE PRINCI-
PLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 69-75 (James A. Morgan ed., James Cockcroft & Co., 1st Am. 
ed. 1875) (1849). Moreover, some English intellectuals were prominent players in the Enlighten-
ment movement that advocated the use of the probability calculus in moral contexts law. See 
DASTON, supra note 9, at xvi, 296-369. 
Legal authors generally heaped scorn on Bentham's "thermometer of persuasion." TWIN-
ING, supra note 20, at 59-60. 
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theories of probability that were in vogue at the time. Lorraine Das-
ton has shown that between 1650 and 1840 theorists in a variety of 
fields attempted to apply the "calculus of chances" to "practical" and 
"moral" problems, including problems of forensic proof.38 The Brit-
ish and American thinkers who scoffed at mathematical analysis of 
evidence were probably aware of these attempts. Thus, they may have 
had their mathematically minded contemporaries and predecessors in 
mind when they argued against the use of mathematical methods in 
law and in other "moral sciences."39 
Formal probability theory may be relevant to the historical study 
of Anglo-American ideas about evidence and proof for other reasons. 
A distinctive characteristic of modern conceptions of proof is the as-
sumption that factual proof is a matter of probabilities and degrees. 
Shapiro maintains, at least for the most part, 40 that almost all British 
and American intellectuals who developed and propagated the new 
empiricism embraced this pivotal assumption. If Shapiro is right, 
these intellectuals may have embraced a basic premise of a twentieth-
century theory of uncertainty, the standard probability calculus. 
In the standard calculus of probabilities, the probability of a hy-
pothesis can range from "impossible" to "certain." The probability of . 
a hypothesis is represented by real numbers. By convention "O" repre-
sents impossible; "l," certain; and numbers between "O" and "l," de-
grees of probability between impossible and certain, with larger 
numbers representing greater degrees of probability. In this system 
probability can have an infinite number of values because the set of 
real numbers in the interval from "O" to "l" is uncountably infinite. 
By proclaiming that factual proof involves probabilities and degrees of 
probabilities, Anglo-American thinkers may have effectively accepted 
the tenet of the standard modern theory of probability that uncer-
tainty is properly gauged or expressed by a scale consisting of a contin-
uum of values. 
If a person grants that probabilities are part of a continuum, it does 
not follow that he thinks about uncertainty the same way that a propo-
nent of the standard probability calculus does. The standard calculus 
works as it does only if certain other premises are granted.41 Nonethe-
38. DASTON, supra note 9, at xvi, 40-47, 296-369. Most of the probabilists who advocated 
the use of calculus in the law were not English. However, at least one English religious figure 
used probability calculus in an attempt to justify the credibility of miracles and religious tradi-
tion. Id. at 312-15 (John Craig's theory of the probability of testimony). 
39. John Stuart Mill, who rejected numerical analysis of forensic evidence, explicitly referred 
to proposals for using the doctrine of chances to assess the credibility of witnesses. See DASTON, 
supra note 9, at 297; see also p. 254. Shapiro reports that William Wills was also familiar with 
such literature. P. 254. 
40. See infra text accompanying note 47. 
41. For example, the probability calculus requires the assumption that the probability of a 
hypothesis and the probability of its negation are complementary or, more generally speaking, 
the assumption that the probabilities of disjoint and exhaustive hypotheses sum to one. See IAN 
May 1993] History: Probability and Evidence 1475 
less, there are several reasons why the standard theory of probability 
may be a useful heuristic device for historical investigation of concep-
tions of evidence and proof. The first and most obvious reason is the 
possibility that at least some British and American empiricists effec-
tively embraced the other premises that make the standard probability 
calculus run. Second, even if analysis shows that some historical 
figures did not accept all of the central premises of the standard mod-
em theory of probability, a comparison of the principles favored by 
such historical figures and those embraced by conventional modem 
probabilists could throw historical conceptions of evidence and proof 
into sharper relief and thus make them more transparent and more 
intelligible to a modem observer. Finally, careful inspection of any 
differences between the assumptions of modem probabilists and those 
of historical figures might show that some historical conceptions of 
evidence and proof resemble one of the several nonstandard formal 
theories of uncertainty that exist today; that is, investigation might 
show that some British or American intellectual traditions departed 
from the assumptions underlying the standard calculus in much the 
same way that a particular nonstandard formal theory of uncertainty 
does. This in itself would be an important discovery because it would 
open new lines of investigation.42 
My claim that the standard theory of probability may have heuris-
tic value in historical investigation does not presuppose that the stan-
dard probability calculus is the only valid paradigm of inferential 
argument. The standard calculus is only one of several formal theories 
of uncertainty.43 However, Shapiro fails to make use of any of these 
formal nonstandard theories. For example, she has little to say about 
L. Jonathan Cohen's theory of eliminative induction.44 Cohen main-
tains that his theory, which ascribes ordinal rather than cardinal 
properties to uncertain judgments about facts, has its wellsprings in 
English empiricism.45 Since one of Shapiro's main interests is the in-
fluence of English empiricism on the law of evidence, her failure to 
HACKING, THE LOGIC OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 19 (1965). In a generalized version of the 
standard calculus, the principle that the probabilities of disjoint and exhaustive hypotheses must 
sum to one is viewed as a special case of the principle that where A. B, C, •.. N are disjoint 
events, the probability of either A, B, C, or ... N is the sum of the individual probabilities of A, B, 
C: .•. N. In short: P(A or B or C or ... N) = P(A) + P(B) + P(C) + ... P(N). 
42. Lorraine Daston distinguishes between conceptual probability and mathematical 
probability. DASTON, supra note 9, at 13. The distinction is necessary because, as Daston writes, 
some conceptions of probability are less amenable to mathematical interpretation than others. 
However, the distinction does not entirely justify jettisoning the use of mathematical probability 
in the study of the history of conceptions of evidence and proof. Some conceptions of probability 
are amenable to mathematical treatment. 
43. Tillers, supra note 19, at 382-83, 389-90. 
44. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977). 
45. Id. § 12, at 42; id. § 46, at 144-51 ("Mill's canons" can be subsumed under Cohen's 
"method of relevant variables."). Cohen calls his system of probability "Baconian" in honor of 
Francis Bacon. Id. § 12, at 42-43. 
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make use of Cohen's "Baconian" theory may be even more unfortu-
nate than her failure to make use of the standard probability 
calculus. 46 
Although my criticism of Shapiro's treatment of formal theories of 
uncertainty stands on its own, it also highlights a more general weak-
ness of Shapiro's investigative strategy. The overarching flaw in Sha-
piro's methodology is her failure to consider the epistemic needs and 
interests of a significant part of her intended audience - students of 
evidence. Parts III and IV of this essay spell out this criticism. Part V 
suggests how Shapiro might have structured her historical investiga-
tion to make it more relevant to contemporary debates about the na-
ture of forensic evidence and proof. 
III. PROBABILITY AND PRACTICAL CERTAINTY 
Shapiro's treatment of the reasonable doubt standard illustrates 
how failure to attend to theoretical principles and distinctions can 
damage historical investigation of conceptions of evidence and proof. 
Shapiro reports that as the influence of British empiricism grew, mem-
bers of the Anglo-American intelligentsia increasingly insisted that 
factual proof has a probabilistic character and always falls short of the 
absolute certainty that strict logical demonstration provides.47 De-
spite this, Shapiro asserts, many of these same people insisted that 
proof of facts to a "practical certainty" is possible. 
The idea that there is a practical certainty short of absolute cer-
tainty may strike some observers as odd. The idea seems incoherent at 
first blush because it seems tantamount to the notion of "certain un-
certain proof," which is a contradiction in terms. Shapiro is not obliv-
ious to the problematic character of the notion of practical certainty. 
She describes various attempts to explain and vindicate the notion, 
and she pays particular attention to an explanation advanced by John 
Locke and some other empiricists. However, as we shall see, in the 
eyes of many modem observers, these explanations may be as incoher-
ent as the concept of practical certainty itself. 48 
46. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for further discussion of Cohen's theory and 
its uses. 
47. See, e.g., p. 33. Shapiro sometimes hedges her claim that the new British thinkers be-
lieved that proof to a practical certainty falls short of absolute certainty. For example, she does 
so in her discussion of Thomas Reid and the Scottish "Common Sense" school of philosophy. 
See, e.g., p. 28. Shapiro does not view Reid's position as an aberration. She asserts that Reid and 
the Common Sense school had great influence on legal treatises on evidence. P. 223. 
48. It is not clear whether Shapiro personally endorses either the concept of practical cer-
tainty or the explanations of practical certainty that theorists such as John Locke provided. 
However, the theoretical significance of Beyond Reasonable Doubt may not depend on whether 
Shapiro is an advocate as well as an observer. Consider Shapiro's stance toward Locke's theory. 
See infra text accompanying notes 50-51. If Locke's interpretation of reasonable doubt and prac-
tical certainty is incoherent and Shapiro accepts Locke's interpretation, Shapiro's own position is 
incoherent. If Locke's interpretation is incoherent but Shapiro does not endorse it, Shapiro's 
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According to Shapiro, some English theorists - most notably, 
John Locke - believed that proof to a "practical (or moral) certainty" 
is tantamount to proof to "the highest degree of probability" (p. 8). 
These theorists apparently believed that the notion of the highest 
probability provides a valid basis for a distinction both between practi-
cal certainty and absolute certainty and between practical certainty 
and lesser degrees of probability. For example, many of these empiri-
cists subscribed to the view that matters such as "opinion" and "suspi-
cion" belong to the realm of "conjecture" and "mere" probability, and 
they generally admitted that practical certainty falls short of absolute 
certainty. However, these empiricists also insisted that proof to a 
practical certainty is something more than a merely probable proof: 
proof to a practical certainty establishes a fact to the highest degree of 
probability whereas a merely probable proof does not. Thus, if Sha-
piro's account is accurate, John Locke and the other British thinkers 
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The idea of a highest possible probability short of absolute cer-
tainty is not without its difficulties. For example, a theorist who re-
gards the standard probability calculus as the only coherent 
interpretation of uncertainty must insist that the only coherent notion 
of certainty is complete or absolute certainty. She must therefore re-
ject the concept of a "highest degree of probability" as incoherent. 
Consider the interval (PrC,C} in Figure 1. Suppose that this interval 
represents the difference between "practical certainty" and "cer-
tainty." This interval, no matter how small, is a finite interval. If 
every probability is a point on a continuum, the interval PrC to C can 
always be made smaller; any finite interval is infinitely divisible. 
historical analysis may be bereft of theoretical significance. Has Shapiro been caught by this kind 
of dilemma? My answer is a qualified "yes." 
1478 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1465 
Therefore, PrC cannot possibly be the highest value. Thus, no matter 
how close PrC is to C it can be made closer. For example, as Figure 2 
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large number of points can lie in any interval between C and any point 
short of C no matter how small that interval is. Hence, if the conven-
tional theory of probability describes how probability behaves, a proof 
that fails to make a hypothesis certain (or, alternatively, impossible) 
cannot possibly prove a fact to the "highest degree of probability."49 
49. Cf. Jeffrey, supra note 8, at 1-2. Jeffrey states: 
The [Bayesian] framework ... replaces the two Cartesian options, affirmation and denial, by 
a continuum of judgmental probabilities in the interval from 0 to 1, endpoints included, or 
- what comes to the same thing - a continuum of judgmental odds in the interval from 0 
to co, endpoints included. Zero and 1 are probabilities no less than 1/2 and 99/100 are. 
Probability 1 corresponds to infinite odds, 1 :0. That's a reason for thinking in terms of odds: 
to remember how momentous it may be to assign probability 1 to a hypothesis. It means 
you'd stake your all on its truth, if it's the sort of hypothesis you can stake things on. 
Id. However, Jeffrey errs in saying that infinity is an endpoint. Infinity has no end. 
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Practitioners of formal probability theory are not the only people 
who might make the kind of objection I have described. A perfectly 
"ordinary" student of evidence might make a similar objection in the 
following way: 
I do not understand how there can be a "highest probability." Suppose 
that the available evidence seems to make a fact very probable and thus 
practically certain. Regardless of how probable any such fact may seem, 
it is always possible to imagine an additional piece of evidence that will 
make a possible fact seem more probable. Hence, there is no highest 
possible or imaginable probability of a fact in issue. 
It is unclear whether Shapiro believes that the idea of practical 
certainty is coherent. 50 Hence, if Shapiro were faced with the sort of 
criticism that I have just described, she might respond that her job is 
to report past beliefs about proof, not to defend them. However, this 
would be an inadequate response. 51 Shapiro tacitly promised not just 
to show us how people once thought about proof, but also to shed light 
on contemporary problems of proof. In any event, Shapiro's history of 
ideas about reasonable doubt and practical certainty may give our in-
tellectual ancestors less credit than they deserve. 
Consider an example. Shapiro maintains that the founders of the 
modern theory of evidence believed that proof of facts involves degrees 
of probability. This amounts to the claim that those founders believed 
that proof should be graded on a cardinal scale. This means, for ex-
ample, that they believed that one proof might be twice as strong as 
another. However, Shapiro does not consider the possibility that the 
historical figures she discusses believed that it is sometimes appropri-
ate to grade proof with an ordinal scale. This would mean that they 
believed that sometimes it is permissible to say only that one proof is 
stronger or weaker than another proof, but not how much stronger or 
weaker. 
L. Jonathan Cohen has developed a sophisticated and well-known 
ordinal theory of probability and proof. 52 Like some of the historical 
figures that Shapiro discusses, Cohen maintains that something akin to 
practical certainty about facts is possible. 53 My criticism of the "high-
est probability" interpretation of the reasonable doubt standard and 
50. The passage quoted infra in the text accompanying note 57 suggests that Shapiro thinks 
that the idea of practical certainty is both coherent and sensible. 
51. See supra note 48. 
52. COHEN, supra note 44. 
53. Id. §§ 27-28, at 82-86; § 68, at 247-252; id. at 265 ("Proof beyond reasonable doubt is 
proof at the level of inductive certainty."); see also 1 SCHUM, supra note 9, at 106-11, 397-401 
(explaining Cohen's theory of "weight" and "provability"); see also L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role 
of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof. 66 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1986). There is an important 
difference between the concept of "certainty" in standard probability theory and the concept of 
"inductive certainty" in Cohen's Baconian probability system. In Cohen's system a hypothesis 
that has been proven is subject to disproof by additional evidence. In the standard probability 
calculus a proposition that is certain cannot be refuted or weakened by evidence. 
1480 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:146S 
practical certainty does not apply to Cohen's ordinal interpretation of 
the reasonable doubt standard. 54 It is unfortunate that Shapiro does 
not make use of Cohen's theory. 55 Cohen maintains that his theory 
lies squarely in the intellectual tradition epitomized by British empiri-
cists such as Bacon, Hume, and J.S. Mill.56 If Cohen is right, British 
empiricists make sense only if their words are read through ordinal 
lenses. 
The difficulties that Shapiro encounters because of her failure to 
use nonstandard theories of probability and proof are not limited to 
her discussion of the reasonable doubt standard. As the next part of 
this essay demonstrates, Shapiro's analysis of the probable cause stan-
dard encounters a variety of problems. As in other contexts, Shapiro 
assumes that factual proof concerns only degrees or levels of probabili-
ties. However, her analysis of the vagaries of the probable cause stan-
dard also rests on the thesis that there are fundamental differences 
among various types of probabilistic proof. This thesis may be incom-
patible with the assumption that proof involves only probabilities. 
IV. PROBABILITY AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
Shapiro argues that the probable cause standard, in contrast to the 
reasonable doubt standard, has been unstable for centuries. She ex-
plains this in the following way: 
The realm of probability is a clearly intermediate one between absolute 
opinion and mere opinion or rumor, but it contains no clear steps, de-
grees, or levels of probability in the scale of just above opinion to just 
below certainty, and it has no agreed upon measure of quantities of 
probability .... Purely epistemological discussion of grand jury stan-
dards [standards which require more than mere opinion but something 
less than almost complete certainty] is inherently unstable. It constantly 
moves up the scale toward "satisfied conscience," "moral certainty," and 
"beyond reasonable doubt," or down the scale toward "suspicion" or 
"opinion" because there is no fixed intermediate point at which to rest. 
[p. 44] 
Shapiro's argument assumes several distinct levels or species of 
proof. The strongest type of proof is absolute or demonstrative proof, 
which lies at one end of the spectrum. Short of absolute proof, but 
close to it, is practical certainty. Further removed is everything else, 
S4. An ordinal scale merely ranks probabilities. Unlike a cardinal scale, an ordinal measure 
of probabilities cannot express the extent or magnitude of the difference between any two 
probabilities. Hence, an ordinal scale does not rule out the idea of a highest probability short of 
certainty. 
SS. Although there is a citation to Cohen in the bibliography for Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 
Shapiro does not discuss Cohen's theory. Shapiro does discuss Cohen's theory in one of her 
earlier books. See SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 277 n.69. However, that discussion consists of a 
short paragraph (in a footnote) and there, as here, Shapiro does not invoke Cohen's theory in her 
analysis of historical conceptions of probability. 
S6. See supra note 4S. 
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which she and her intellectual compatriots call "mere probability," 
"opinion," and "conjecture." This conception of species of proof is 
depicted in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 
p 
?-. I I 
P = "Probability" PrC c 
PrC = "Practical Certainty" 
C = "Certainty" 
Shapiro's taxonomy of proof presents numerous difficulties. Con-
sider first Shapiro's view of the domain of probability. While almost 
all modem observers would grant that the "realm of probability is ... 
[an] intermediate one," a theorist who believes that the standard 
probability calculus is the only valid paradigm of rational inference 
would insist that the outer boundaries of probability are quite different 
from those shown in Figure 3. She would say that the appropriate 
distinction is not between (a) conclusions that are merely probably 
true (or false) and conclusions that are very probably true (or false), 
but between (b) arguments that make factual hypotheses probable and 
those that make factual hypotheses either certain or impossible. She 
would insist that all arguments that fail to produce indubitable conclu-
sions about factual hypotheses fall into the realm of probability. Thus, 
in her eyes, the realm of probabilistic reasoning is marked off at one 
end of the scale not by conclusions that are "almost certainly" true, 
but by conclusions that are indubitably and necessarily true; at the 
other end of the scale, it is marked off not by weakly supported "suspi-
cion" or "opinion," but by conclusions that are indubitably and neces-
sarily false. 
A conventional probabilist envisions species of proof in the manner 
shown in Figure 4. This figure shows that the only difference among 
uncertain hypotheses is a difference of degree; some of them are more, 
or less, probable than some others. In every other respect all uncer-
tain hypotheses - whether labeled "opinion," "probable," or "practi-
cally certain" - are exactly the same. 
A conventional probabilist would also reject Shapiro's claim that 
"probability ... contains no ... steps, degrees, or levels of probability" 
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in the interval between "just above opinion" and "just below cer-
tainty." As we have already seen, Shapiro places probability some-
where above opinion and somewhere below certainty. Hence, Shapiro 
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conventional probability theorist would reject the taxonomy of proof 
shown in Figure 5. He could phrase his objection in one of two ways. 
On the one hand, he might say that if one type of factual proof can be 
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distinguished from another type of factual proof, the only possible fun-
damental distinction between different types of proof is the distinction 
between probabilistic proof and conclusive proof. 57 On the other 
hand, he might say that if there are differences in proof "all along the 
line," the number oflevels of probabilistic proofs is uncountably large. 
The gist of the first version of the probabilist's objection is appar-
ent. He claims that no fundamental difference. exists between one 
probabilistic proof and any other. The same type ·of uncertainty in-
fects every probabilistic proof. The only difference between proofs lies 
in the different probabilities that they produce. · 
The second version of the probabilist's objection is essentially the 
same as the first because, like the first, it rests on the idea that differ-
ences in the weights of proofs are expressed as diffe~ences in probabili-
ties. 58 Figure 6 shows how a conventional probability theorist thinks 
probability behaves. · The numbers on the scale in Figure 6 represent 
different probability values. The possible probability values of hypoth-
eses are the numbers in the interval { 0, 1 J. This set of numbers is un-
countably infinite. Consequently, the claim that in the realm of 
"mere" probability there are no gradations, degrees, or levels is incor-
rect; the number of gradations of probability is uncountably infinite. 59 
Practically every student of probability theory or of any other for-
mal theory of uncertainty would have difficulty understanding Sha-
piro's claim that the probable cause standard, unlike the reasonable 
doubt standard, fluctuates because probability has no "logical resting 
57. In the standard probability calculus conclusive proof is a special case of probabilistic 
proof. See Jeffrey, supra note 8. 
58. Inferential arguments can be distinguished on the basis of considerations other than 
weight. For example, they can be characterized by the type of evidence used or by the structure 
of the argument. See Peter Tillers, Webs of Things in the Mind; A New Science of Evidence, 87 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 1225, 1232-1238 (1989) (reviewing DAVID A. SCHUM, EVIDENCE AND INFER-
ENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST (1987)) (describing Schum's theory of inferential 
argument). 
59. Shapiro's claim that "probability ..• has no agreed upon measure of quantities of 
probability" is also problematic. Probability theory's "agreed upon measure of quantities of 
probability" is the set of real numbers ranging from "O" to "1." Moreover, ordinary ways of 
expressing probabilities - for example, "there is a 60% chance of rain" - often use a similar 
scale. Shapiro's notion that probability has no measure of probability betrays a failure to appre-
ciate the point of some types of probability talk. In the standard theory of probability, 
probability is nothing other than a measure or scale of uncertainty. No one should expect that 
the language of probability itself measures probability. The mathematical language of 
probability is used to measure or express (the magnitude of) uncertainty. Ordinary people often 
use probabilistic terms in the same way and for the same reason. 
Shapiro's claim that "probability contains no clear steps [or] degrees," (p. 44, emphasis ad-
ded) and her claim that the "scale of probabilities ha[s] no precise steps," (p. 79, emphasis added) 
are exaggerations at best. The set of numbers ranging from "O" to "l" can be used to express 
judgments about uncertainty precisely and clearly. Shapiro's complaint about the alleged ab-
sence of a precise measure of probability is odd. Most modern critics of mathematical 
probability complain that the precision of mathematical expressions tempts people to express 
probability estimates with too much precision. See, e.g .. Tribe, supra note 18, at 1331, 1361-65, 
1389-91. I see no reason in principle why ordinary ways of expressing probabilities (for example, 
by the use of percentages) are incapable of being precise. 
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place."60 Any serious student of uncertainty and probability would 
admit that neither probability nor the logic of probability can possibly 
determine the "resting place" of probability, much less the resting 
place of any probabilistically formulated legal requirement such as 
"probable cause." Nevertheless, it does not follow that "probable 
cause" cannot have a "resting place," or settled meaning. Shapiro's 
complaint is that the legal standard of probable cause has no clear 
probability value. However, a probability is not a thing; a probability 
value reflects or expresses a judgment. Although nothing in 
probability theory determines the choice of a probability value for 
probable cause, nothing in the notion of probability prevents the as-
signment of a specific probability value to the legal requirement of 
probable cause. Shapiro has placed the blame for the law's fuzziness 
about the meaning of probable cause at the wrong doorstep. 
The last criticism (and criticisms like it) could be made by in-
numerate students of evidence. No special expertise in mathematical 
probability is required to see that nothing in the bare idea of the uncer-
tainty of facts prevents courts or legislators from stipulating precisely 
how much probability (for example, of guilt) is required for a showing 
of probable cause. Innumerate as well as numerate people can readily 
understand that the true question is not whether the law can be pre-
cise. The true question is whether the law ought to be precise or why 
the law has not been precise about the meaning of probable cause. 61 
I have examined various criticisms of Shapiro's views of the prob-
able cause and reasonable doubt standards. These criticisms do not 
prove that Shapiro's ultimate conclusions are wrong. For example, 
60. The notion that probability has no natural resting place is central to Shapiro's extended 
discussion of the instability of the probable cause standard through the centuries. Shapiro even 
attempts to explain the vagaries of modern American probable cause jurisprudence on this basis. 
See pp. 107-11. 
61. Shapiro refers to judicial opinions asserting that probable cause eludes definition. See, 
e.g., p. 147 (quoting Illinois v. Galic, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983)). However, when courts say 
that "probable cause" resists definition, they are not necessarily saying that it is logically impossi-
ble to attach a probability value to probable cause. Instead, they may be saying that it is impru-
dent to require a single probability value for all probable cause problems, that it is better for the 
law to use fuzzy probability values, or that it is better to allow the trier of fact to choose a 
probability value for probable cause. A footnote in Beyond Reasonable Doubt refers to material 
that suggests these rationales, but Shapiro does not explore them. See p. 273 n.138. 
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they do not conclusively demonstrate that there is no difference in 
kind between the reasonable doubt and probable cause standards. 
However, the purpose of my discussion is not to prove that Shapiro 
reached the wrong conclusions. My purpose is to show that an intel-
lectual historian who wishes to address problems of evidence in to-
day's world must take into account how today's students of evidence 
tend to think about probability and proof. For example, although it is 
possible that the distinction between "practical certainty" and "prob-
able cause" is tenable, a convincing case for the distinction can be 
made only if the sorts of objections and criticisms described above are 
confronted directly. My claim is that Shapiro did not do this. 
V. INTERROGATING HISTORY 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt is an example of painstaking historical 
scholarship. Nonetheless, there is something wrong with Shapiro's 
book. Although Shapiro devotes careful attention to details, she some-
times ignores important details. The reason is that she sometimes fails 
to ask the right questions. 
A hypothesis is a kind of question; a hypothesis is a question in 
search of evidence. One of Shapiro's hypotheses is that the conception 
of evidence and proof now found in the law of evidence is the result of 
the diffusion of an empiricist epistemology. According to Shapiro, one 
of the hallmarks of this epistemology is the view that empirical knowl-
edge is a matter of probabilities and degrees of probabilities. Shapiro 
does an admirable job of gathering and presenting the evidence that 
supports her hypothesis about the influence of empiricism on the law 
of evidence. Unfortunately, other hypotheses or questions about em-
piricism may be far more interesting than the general hypothesis that 
Shapiro normally addresses. 
Most contemporary debates about evidence and proof concern ed-
dies in the stream of probabilistic empiricism rather than the question 
of the existence or validity of the stream itself. Although Shapiro's 
book is not about contemporary evidence scholarship, debates and dis-
cussions about proof in 1793 as well as in 1993 may have centered 
more on wrinkles in empiricist epistemology than on the general ques-
tion of the validity of empiricism. 62 Shapiro fails to explore some very 
important details in the historical record. I think this is because her 
theoretical "frame of discemment"63 is too coarse. I offer three 
62. I do not claim that Shapiro ignores all wrinkles in the empiricist tradition. That is 
plainly not true. For example, in one of her earlier studies Shapiro identified a variety of conno-
tations historically associated with the term "probability." See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 
3-6, 37-44, 189. 
63. The phrase "frame of discernment" is Glenn Shafer's. See GLENN SHAFER, A MATHE-
MATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE 114-40, 172-95 (1976). While Shafer emphasizes how evidence 
serves to refine coarse hypotheses, my emphasis here is on how the questions and hypotheses we 
have in mind affect our ability to see interesting evidence. 
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illustrations. 64 
The first illustration involves the reasonable doubt standard. As 
discussed above, 65 Shapiro believes that the reasonable doubt standard 
requires "practical certainty," which in turn requires proof to the 
highest probability. I have not argued that the idea of practical uncer-
tainty is necessarily incoherent. However, I have argued that the no-
tion of a highest probability (short of absolute certainty) is incoherent 
if one assumes that proof is a matter of degrees. Assume I am right. 
The question now becomes whether the idea of practical certainty can 
be salvaged not by a frontal assault on the idea that all facts are uncer-
tain to some degree, but by confession and avoidance. In one discus-
sion Shapiro supplies a quotation that provides food for thought about 
this question. 
Shapiro quotes Greenleaf as saying that "satisfactory evidence" of 
guilt is evidence sufficient "to satisfy the mind and conscience of a 
common man, and so to convince the jurors, that he would venture to 
act upon that conviction, in the matters of highest concern and impor-
tance to his own interest" (p. 38). In this passage Greenleaf seems to 
say that the legal requirement of practical or moral certainty demands 
not the highest possible degree of probability, but the degree of 
probability that would warrant a wager that the fact at issue is true. 66 
Greenleaf's belief - that jurors should make a decision about the suf-
ficiency of the evidence in a criminal case by asking themselves 
whether they would be willing to stake important interests of their 
own on a wager that the accused is guilty - might warm the hearts 
and stir the minds of students of evidence who have a yen for decision 
theory. 
Decision theorists insist that the problem of choice always involves 
two questions: (a) What are the odds?, and (b) What's at stake? They 
believe that the second question is as important as the first when a 
decision must be made and when the options available to the decision 
maker have consequences. Although Greenleaf plainly wanted to tilt 
the scales in favor of the accused, Greenleaf's statement suggests that 
he believed that jurors can locate reasonable doubt and practical cer-
64. I do not claim that the conjectures I describe below are supported by the historical evi-
dence. I only claim that Shapiro's description of historical source material suggests that an ex-
amination of some of the conjectures I describe might have been productive. 
65. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
66. Cf. DASTON, supra note 9. 
In the latter half of the seventeenth century, ... another strain of probabilistic reasoning 
emerged in the writings of proponents of rational theology and the new natural philoso-
phy .... These writers, including Robert Boyle, John Wilkins, Joseph Glanvill, Marin Mer-
senne, Pierre Gassendi, and Hugo Grotius, simultaneously insisted upon the incorrigible 
uncertainty of almost all human knowledge and on our ability to nonetheless attain to infer-
ior degrees of "physical" and "moral" certainty .... A proof for a hypothesis in natural 
philosophy or the precepts of Christianity need not achieve mathematical rigor, but only 
that threshold of certainty sufficient to persuade a reasonable man to act in daily life. 
Id. at 56-57. 
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tainty on the appropriate point in the continuum of probabilities if and 
only if they consider1the gravity or importance of the interests at stake. 
If this is what Gree.nleaf meant, it is quite possible that he believed 
that there is no highest probability of guilt, short of certainty. Fur-
thermore, he may have believed that the appropriate question for the 
jury is not "How much probability makes the guilt of the accused 
practically certain?'~ but, "Given the importance of the interests at 
stake, what degree c:>f probability should we require before we decide 
to proclaim the guilt of the accused?" Shapiro ignores this possible 
"decision theoretic" .interpretation of Greenleaf 's language. 
The quotation from Greenleaf is interesting for another reason. 
Greenleaf's view that jurors should consider the level of probability 
that they would demand when their own interests are at stake seems to 
import a moral principle into the jury's decision making process; that 
is, Greenleaf may be, suggesting (or assuming) that the decision about 
the amount of probability required for conviction depends on moral 
considerations. This would not seem odd to some modem theorists. 
One school of decision theory takes the view that a rational decision 
maker seeks to maximize expected utility. 67 Some students of decision 
theory believe that the maximum expected utility decision rule (or, 
presumably, any similar decision rule) rests on normative, practical, or 
psychological considerations rather than solely on logical or epistemo-
logical grounds. 68 
My second example of the value of modem thinking in historical 
investigation of conceptions of evidence and proof involves Wigmore. 
Shapiro mentions a tripartite classification of evidence in William 
67. See, e.g., VON WINTERFELDT & EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 18 ("[W]e will state without 
proof the decision rule to which this book is committed: maximization of expected utility."); 
Ward Edwards, Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism, and the Collins Case: An Appeal to 
Reason, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1025, 1057 (1991) ("In any decision situation in which the stakes 
are modest relative to the resources of the decision maker, the optimal decision rule is maximiza-
tion of utility or expected utility."); see also Isaac Levi, On Indeterminate Probabilities, in DECI-
SION, PROBABILITY, AND UTILITY 287, 290 (Peter Giirdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin eds., 1988). 
Bayesians adopt as their fundamental principle of rational choice the principle that an op-
tion is admissible only if it bears maximum expected utility among all the feasible options. 
Very few serious writers on the topic of rational choice object to the principle of maxi-
mizing expected utility in those cases where [a person's] values and credal state can be 
represented by a utility function unique up to a positive affine transformation and a unique 
probability function. The doubts typically registered concern the applicability of this 
principle. 
Levi, supra, at 290; see also Paul Slovic, Choice, in THINKING, AN INVITATION TO COGNmVE 
SCIENCE 89, 90 (Daniel N. Oshershon & Edward E. Smith eds., 1990) (describing the maximum 
expected utility principle but not endorsing it for all purposes). 
68. See, e.g., David T. Wasserman, Comment on Edwards: Ward Edwards and the New 
Bayesian Software, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1075, 1077-79 (1991). Decision theorists who say that 
maximum expected utility is a normative principle as well as a descriptive principle do not neces-
sarily agree with Wasserman. In the context of discussions of decision theory, the term "norma-
tive" is ordinarily a synonym for "rational" or "coherent," but not "moral." See, e.g., Slovic, 
supra note 67, at 91, 96 ("normative study" of choice and "model for rational choice" treated as 
synonymous). 
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Lambarde's handbook for justices of the peace, which was published 
in the seventeenth century (pp. 153-54). This tripartite schema ar-
ranges evidentiary events on the basis of their temporal relationship to 
the matter in issue, with events preceding the matter falling into one 
group, events accompanying the matter into a second, and subsequent 
events into a third. According to Shapiro, Lambarde borrowed this 
tripartite classification from the classical rhetorical tradition (pp. 152-
53). However, Shapiro says nothing about the possible theoretical sig-
nificance of Lambarde's tripartite classification. 
Wigmore utilized a tripartite schema remarkably similar to 
Lambarde's. 69 However, modem evidence scholars, who generally 
still have great respect for Wigmore, rarely mention his tripartite 
schema. Apparently they do not think it is important or useful. The 
similarity between Lambarde's and Wigmore's tripartite classification 
schema presents the interesting and possibly important question 
whether Wigmore's classification is merely an unexpected vestige of 
the rhetorical tradition or whether it is something more. Wigmore's 
tripartite classification of evidence challenges the unspoken assump-
tion of some modem theorists of evidence that the logic of rational 
argument about evidence is relational but never causal. 70 Moreover, 
Wigmore's schema rests on the important insight that evidence may be 
causally related to "facts in issue."71 If Shapiro had paid more atten-
tion to modem trends in evidence scholarship, she might have realized 
that the similarity between Lambarde's and Wigmore's tripartite clas-
sifications would interest students who believe that causal reasoning 
plays a role in inference. 
My third and final example also involves Wigmore. Shapiro quite 
appropriately emphasizes the importance of the empiricist conception 
of probability in the Anglo-American legal consciousness after the late 
seventeenth century. However, although the idea that proof concerns 
probabilities and degrees is undeniably important, the mere idea that 
all facts (or almost all facts) are uncertain leaves unanswered many 
important questions about the nature of factual proof. Shapiro argues 
that Wigmore, like other English and American treatise writers, be-
lieved that proof involves probabilities (p. 40). This argument is cor-
rect. But it does not go far enough. 
Wigmore did not embrace the calculus of chances. Indeed, as far I 
can determine, he never even referred to it. This is not particularly 
69. IA WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 43 (describing "prospectant," "concomitant," and "re· 
trospectant" evidence). This tripartite classification is the basis for the organization of Wig· 
more's entire treatise on the law of evidence. See the table of contents in any volume of 
Wigmore's treatise. 
70. See Peter Tillers & David A. Schum, Charting New Territory in Judicial Proof, 9 CAR· 
nozo L. RE.v. 907, 942-49 (1988) (explaining the distinction between relational analysis and 
nonrelational evidence marshalling methods). 
71. See Tillers, supra note 58, at 1248-49. 
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surprising or important. What is interesting is that Wigmore almost 
certainly did not believe that the logic of the calculus of chances cap-
tures the essence of rational inference and proof. Wigmore's intellec-
tual ancestors were not mathematical probability theorists such as 
James Bernoulli, who discovered the "law of large numbers," or the 
Reverend Thomas Bayes, who formulated the theorem now known as 
"Bayes' Theorem." Instead, judging by the citations and quotations in 
Wigmore's justly celebrated treatise on the law of evidence, Wigmore 
was influenced by figures such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill. 72 Of course, both Bentham and Mill believed that proof is a mat-
ter of probabilities. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they 
thought about uncertainty and probability the same way that British 
theorists such as Bayes did. 
Consider the experimental methods that Mill favored, now known 
as "Mill's methods." Wigmore thought that Mill's analysis about the 
nature of empirical proof and scientific investigation was right on tar-
get. 73 However, unlike Hume (who was surely an "empiricist") and 
some modem probability theorists, Mill apparently believed that 
causes exist in the world of nature; Mill assumed that a scientist at-
tempts to uncover causes that actually operate in the natural world. 74 
Wigmore's endorsement of Mill's theory of empirical knowledge dis-
tinguishes Wigmore's own epistemological position from other episte-
mological positions, including "empiricist" positions, in a way that no 
amount of talk solely about degrees of probability can. Moreover, 
Mill's methods put a considerable premium on the exhaustiveness or 
completeness of evidence about a hypothesis in a way that Bayesian-
ism, for example, does not.75 Finally, it is possible that Mill's meth-
ods, unlike Bayesian logic, interpret grades of proof ordinally rather 
than cardinally; Mill, like some modem-day Baconians, may have be-
lieved that a scientific hypothesis has been "proven" if a sufficiently 
complete collection of evidence supports that hypothesis without offer-
ing any support for an alternative hypothesis. 76 One of Wigmore's 
72. See, e.g., IA WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 33. It is interesting that Shapiro acknowledges 
the influence of Mill on Sir Fitzjarnes Stephen. P. 273 n.134. However, Shapiro does not explore 
the significance of this point. 
73. IA WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 24 (quoting from the work of Alfred Sidgwick, a follower 
of Mill, with approval); see also, e.g., id. §§ 30, 31, at 991-92; § 33, at 996-98. Although Wig-
more believed that Mill's methods are valid, he did not believe that they are the only valid 
methods for making judgments about uncertain facts. See, e.g., JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE SCI-
ENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §§ 340-352 (3d ed. 1937) (Wigmore's description of his "chart 
method"). 
74. See, for example, Mill's discussion of plurality of causation in 1 JOHN STUART MILL, A 
SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE bk. 3, ch. x (Parker, Son & Bourn 5th ed. 
1862). 
75. See COHEN, supra note 44, § 46 (Cohen, who emphasizes the importance of the com-
pleteness of relevant evidence, interprets Mill's methods as an example of his own "method of 
relevant variables."). 
76. This is roughly the position taken by Cohen. See Cohen, supra note 53. 
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formulations of the relevance principle suggests that Wigmore had an 
ordinal conception of the nature of proof. 11 
Shapiro's treatment of Wigmore is a particularly apt example for 
my purposes. If any evidence scholar from the past still influences 
evidence scholarship and the law of evidence today, it is Wigmore. 
The question of Wigmore's intellectual pedigree, therefore, has a di-
rect bearing on contemporary scholarly and judicial discussions and 
debates about evidence, inference, probability, and proof. If Shapiro's 
"long view"78 of intellectual history is responsibl~ for her failure to 
wrestle with the details of the ideas of figures such as Wigmore, her 
view is overly long. 
CONCLUSION 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt has little to say to modem students of 
evidence. Shapiro's theoretical brush is too coarse; she fails to make 
important distinctions among different conceptions of evidence, infer-
ence, probability, and proof. The probable cause of the theoretical 
weaknesses of Beyond Reasonable Doubt is Shapiro's failure to pay 
careful attention to modem discussions of evidence and proof. 
Although historians are sometimes faulted by their peers for thinking 
anachronistically about the past, good intellectual history may require 
immersion in the ideas of the present as well as of the past. Be that as 
it may, Shapiro's study would have been more interesting to today's 
students of evidence if she had made a greater effort to structure her 
historical investigation in terms of present-day theoretical perspectives 
and concerns. Doing so would not have prevented her from using his-
tory to shake modem scholars free from their unconsidered habits of 
thought and their theoretical prejudices. The peculiar value of histori-
cal inquiry is that the mere framing of a question does not predeter-
mine the answer; like any other body of evidence, historical source 
material always contains surprises. 
77. I WIGMORE, supra note IS, § 32 at 996. 
Thus, throughout the whole realm of evidence, ... the theory of the inductive argument ••• 
is that the evidentiary fact will be considered when and only when the desired conclusion 
based upon it is a more probable or natural, or at least a probable or natural, hypothesis and 
when the other hypotheses or explanations of the fact . .. are either less probable or natural or 
at least not exceedingly more probable or natural. 
Id. (emphasis added); cf IA WIGMORE, supra note IS, § 30, at 986·89 (reviser argues that Wig· 
more's theory of inference and proof resembles Mill's theory more than it does modem "per-
sonalist" theories of inference and probability). 
78. See supra note 26. 
